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ABSTRACT 
Effects of Natural Resources Wealth on Political Outcome and Political Participation 
 
Michael Pang Chung Yang 
Department of Economics 
Texas A&M University 
 
Research Advisor: Dr. Jonathan Meer 
Department of Economics 
 
The emergence of natural resources wealth in the United States has sparked intensive debates 
between the two political parties, Democratic and Republican, on their stance in support of the 
industry. As actions, taken by party or candidate in power, have impact on the regulations 
revolving the management of natural resources in the region, it is hypothesized that the 
significance of the industry within a county plays a role in influencing the county’s voting 
behavior in national and local elections. Recent studies have also found respectively that (1) the 
energy boom and increased drilling activities drive economic growth in local counties and (2) 
economic conditions influence election outcomes by holding the incumbent responsible for 
economic performance. The two findings suggest that the wealth and management of natural 
resources could contribute toward incumbency advantage. In examination of the industry’s 
influence in shaping voting behavior, the present study showed that oil and gas production in the 
industry are significant factors in increasing the Republican Party vote share, which aligns with 
the party’s supportive rhetoric of the industry. In the second part of the study, relationship 
between the two past findings are tested and it is found that oil and gas production remain  as 
important factors in deciding the incumbent’s vote share in elections. It is also found that natural 
resources employment strongly contributes towards incumbency advantage.  
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CHAPTER I  
INTRODUCTION 
 
In the past decade, the United States has slowly emerged as a wealthy nation of natural 
resources. The energy boom, propelled by the shale revolution, led the United States to pursue its 
goal for energy independence and created significant economic growth for oil and gas producing 
states. According to the U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA), imported energy as a 
share of total consumption in the U.S. decreased from 30.06% to 22.08% from 2005 to 2010. 
During the same period, it can be observed that oil and gas production grew by 24.7% and 40% 
respectively. Aside from the efficiency of energy extraction, an equally important aspect of the 
energy boom is its management. In the private sector, the energy companies dictate the 
efficiency of the labor market and the paying structure. On the other hand, government officials 
regulate production taxes and drilling activities. This interdependent relationship between the 
natural resources industry and government poses an interesting question: how influential are the 
wealth and management of natural resources in shaping election outcomes?  
 
It is conceivable that the natural resources wealth in a county may motivate energy companies to 
support political parties or candidates that support the growth of the industry. These companies 
participate in the political arena in the form of political contributions. According to the Center 
for Responsive Politics (CRP), a non-profit and nonpartisan research group, the industry have 
contributed more than two-thirds of its campaign contributions to Republican candidates since 
the 1990 election cycle. In 2014, the political contributions by the oil and gas industry amounted 
to $144 billion .Energy is also perceived to be a polarizing topic that puts both parties to be at 
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odds with each other. In 2012, the NORC Center for Public Affairs conducted a poll and showed 
that 75% of Republicans are against government imposed drilling limits as opposed to the 34% 
of Democrats. Although it is hard to quantify the rhetoric of both parties, the poll and the 
political contribution trend suggest that the Republican Party is perceived to be more supportive 
of the industry.  
 
The management of natural resources is also an important factor to consider as its management 
affects not only the corporations but the people living in these regions. Studies have shown 
natural resources, not properly managed, could have adverse effects on the country’s political 
and economic landscape. Known as the resources curse, a collection of studies showed that 
natural resources, not properly managed, could produce adverse effects on the country’s 
economy (Sachs 2001). This is proposed to be created by rent seeking behavior depending on the 
quality of education and the degree of political participation of the country (Wadho 2014). This 
rent seeking behavior could stem from incentives by private corporations to secure their interests 
in the political realm through political contributions (Heinberg 2015). However, in the United 
States, where education and political participation are high, evidence showed that natural 
resources wealth contributes to economic growth in local communities and counties. The growth 
are realized through higher employment and higher median income for the people in the 
community. The realized benefit may serve as a motivation for the people to vote for a candidate 
that is supportive of the industry. In addition, it is shown that oil and gas production also 
generates revenue for local governments through production taxes, land leases and property 
taxes.   
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These findings introduced questions on the relationship between the natural resources industry 
and election outcomes that this paper seeks to answer. Past studies have shown that the energy 
boom created additional benefits for local communities. At the same time, separate studies found 
evidence that voters utilize economic conditions as a measurement for the incumbent’s 
performance and vote accordingly. It is tempting to infer that the natural resources industry 
contributes towards incumbency advantage. This study addresses this temptation by testing for 
transitive relations between the two findings. Based on the supportive rhetoric of the Republican 
Party and the high proportion of natural resources related political contributions it received, it is 
also hypothesized that oil and gas wealth and its management drives up republican party vote 
shares in national and local elections.  
 
This study found evidence that the transitive relationship between the two findings holds. In 
three different elections – U.S. Presidential, Gubernatorial and U.S. House of Representative – 
across a ten year period between 2000 and 2010, the study found evidence that oil and gas 
production in the year prior to election and the percentage of natural resources employment in a 
county increase the incumbency vote share. As for its effects on Republican Party vote share in 
all the same elections, evidence showed that oil and gas production in the year prior to election 
and incumbency advantage is also a strong predictor.  
 
Literature review and background 
In his essay, Abramowitz elaborated on the historical predictive model for presidential election 
outcomes by discussing results from other studies (1988). Tufte (1978) showed that a percentage 
point increase in per capita income increases the incumbent’s presidential party vote share by 
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almost two percentage points. Tufte (1978) also examined the effects of income change on 
House vote. In his paper, he found that income change has a statistically significant effect on the 
house vote. However, if the election is heled during a presidential election year, the presidential 
vote share has an effect on the vote share for the candidate from the president’s party. Therefore, 
during a presidential election year, his model showed the per capita income change to be 
statistically significant and the presidential vote for the incumbent’s party to be significant. It is 
therefore concluded that the candidate may ride on the president’s coattails and that the effects of 
the per capita income change on house vote is indirectly generated through the presidential vote 
factor.  
 
The second consideration in constructing a model to measure the effect of economic conditions 
on election outcome is the type of economic variables. This consideration has sparked extensive 
debate on whether a voter prioritizes the national economic condition or that of his own 
household. A voter is called sociotropic if he votes based on information regarding the national 
economy while a pocketbook voting is one where a voter decides based on his own economic 
conditions. While many studies have shown that sociotropic voting is more prevalent, these 
studies are often scrutinized for their inability to differentiate the effects of sociotropic voting 
from pocketbook voting (Marcus 1988).   
 
Aside from the scope of economic voting, the perspective that voters adopt in their economic 
assessment of the candidate also plays a role in shaping voting behavior. Surveys conducted in 
past studies showed that voters tend to evaluate economic conditions in a retrospective manner 
(Lewis-Beck 1988). However, this is a controversial topic as there are conflicting evidence on 
6 
 
whether voters are generally more retrospective or prospective in their evaluation. For this paper, 
we assume that voters are retrospective because of the evidence by Lewis-Beck and also because 
evidence that candidates tend to use past achievements as a way to convince voters to vote for 
them or to dissuade voters to vote for their opponents.  
 
Another consideration is that economic incentivized voting behavior is not uniform across all 
elections. In senate elections, voting behavior is influenced by the success of the presidency 
since senators serve the national legislative branch while gubernatorial elections are more driven 
by state economic conditions since governors are state executives (Markus 1998).  
 
As for evidence on the economic benefits of fracking and the shale revolution, Weber concluded 
that gas production creates modest employment for the county (2011). Employments are not only 
generated within the natural resources industry but also across other related industries such as 
transportation and construction. A recent study by Feyner et al in 2015 confirms the finding by 
Weber that counties with oil and gas production generates economic benefits through an 
increased in employment (0.78 new jobs) and increased in income ($66,000) with every million 
dollars of oil and gas production. The aforementioned two papers were only investigating direct 
economic benefits to the population. Through production taxes and lease payments, local 
governments also accrued added revenues with oil and gas production from oil and gas 
companies (Newell and Raimi  2015). These added revenues may indirectly help the incumbent 
candidate by having him reinvest these revenues into his county or state. Although these 
evidences are strong, these papers are conducted over heavy oil and gas producing states such as 
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Arkansas, Colorado, Louisiana and Texas. It is unclear whether marginal oil and gas production 
will create an equal proportion of economic benefits.  
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CHAPTER II 
METHODS 
 
Data 
The dataset is compiled using a variety of sources. To compile data on election results, I utilize 
the Harvard Election Data Archive (HEDA) which compiles available data on national and local 
elections through various state government sites. For this study, data is collected on the U.S. 
presidential election, gubernatorial election, and the U.S. house of representative election across 
a ten-year period from year 2000 to 2010. The voting data is compiled on the county-level and is 
the votes are categorized as democratic votes (dv) or republican votes (rv). The total vote casted 
during each election (tv) is calculated as the sum of both party votes. For the purpose of this 
study, independent party votes are excluded.   
 
To establish the incumbent candidate vote share and the incumbency advantage factor, I created 
a dummy variable based on the runoff election. If the incumbent candidate is not on the ballot, 
then the dummy variable is assigned the value “0”. Otherwise, the republican incumbent is 
assigned the value “1” and the democratic incumbent candidate is assigned the value “-1”.  The 
incumbent vote share is equivalent to either the 𝑑𝑣 or 𝑟𝑣 based on the party identification of the 
incumbent candidate. 
 
The vote share for both the incumbent candidate and republican candidate is calculated as a 
proportion of the total vote share in the ballot such as 
𝑖𝑣
𝑡𝑣
 and 
𝑟𝑣
𝑡𝑣
. For the U.S. House of 
Representative elections, counties are assigned their respective candidates based on the 
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congressional districts the counties belong. Counties are assigned their respective state 
candidates for the gubernatorial election and candidates are the same in each county for the 
presidential election.  
 
To measure the size of natural resources in each county, oil and gas production data is compiled 
through the United States Energy Information Administration database. The data compiled are 
also at the county-level. Although annual production is not an accurate representation of natural 
resources wealth available in the region, data on oil and gas proven reserves are often unknown 
or private. Therefore, production is the next best available approximation for natural resources 
wealth. In the data set, oil production is measured by the barrels while gas production is 
measured by thousand cubic feet.  
 
Another variable compiled for the dataset is the level of political contributions in each county. 
Political contributions data is compiled by Sunlight Foundation and Influence Explorer and the 
dataset is further categorized by the political party receiving the contributions. Unfortunately, 
county-level data collected is not further classified by its industry sectors and therefore, the data 
can only serve to measure contributions from all sectors to the specific county.  
 
Another two variables compiled to measure the management of natural resources are annual 
employment and annual average income. The data is compiled through the Bureau of Labor 
Statistics under the Quarterly Census of Employment and Wages (QCEW) program. Through the 
database, I extracted data on employment and annual average pay for both the entire county and 
only natural resources and mining industry.  
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Datasets compiled are formatted and merged into a longitudinal panel data set. The election 
outcome dataset is formatted into three variables: election type, year, state and county. It is worth 
noting that the election data is not uniformly available across the states. Election results from 6 
states – Alaska, Delaware, Hawaii, Illinois, Indiana, and West Virginia – are not available. For 
the remaining states, data is available for certain years and certain elections.  
 
The dataset compiled for this study consists of 22669 observations with an average of 1786 
observations for election results of a specific election type in a specific year. It is also interesting 
to highlight that the number of observations are biased towards the later period of our study. This 
is due to states improving their data collection methodology.  
 
Methodology 
To test the relationship between oil and gas production and election outcome, I performed an 
ordinary least square (OLS) regression on the panel data compiled. The first regression equation 
constructed tests for the effects of natural resources wealth and management on Republican party 
vote share.  
rvratiocounty,election,year
= 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 ∙ ln(𝑜𝑖𝑙𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟) + 𝛽2 ∙ ln(𝑔𝑎𝑠𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟) + 𝛽3 ∙ 𝑟𝑝𝑐𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜 + 𝛽4 ∙ 𝑖𝑎 + 𝛽5
∙
nremployment
𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡
+ 𝛽6 ∙
nrpay
𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑝𝑎𝑦
+ 𝜖 
 
The Republican Party vote share (𝑟𝑣𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜) is measured as the proportion of total votes casted in 
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the ballot for the two political parties. Therefore, 𝑟𝑣𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜 =
𝑟𝑣
𝑑𝑣+𝑟𝑣
. For the independent variables 
included in the regression equation above, the variables undergo certain transformations to cater 
for the 𝑟𝑣𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜 property as a vote share instead of an absolute number.  
 
Both oil and gas production are fairly large in producing counties. The means of both production 
variables for each county are approximately 440,000 barrels and 6,650,000 tcbf. Therefore the 
effects of production on the vote share may be hard to interpret if the regression is performed 
with the original variable. To simplify the model, both variables undergo a logarithm 
transformation which allows us to better interpret the coefficients as the percentage change in 
vote share due to a one percent change in the variables.  
 
For natural resources employment variable, it is more useful to study the effects of the natural 
resources employment as a percentage of the total employment in the county instead of the 
number of employment in the industry. It is also more interesting to level of natural resources 
industry pay relative to the other industries in the county instead of the absolute level of the 
industry pay itself. The annual average pay variable is then transformed by the function 
nrpay
𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑝𝑎𝑦
 
where 𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑝𝑎𝑦 =  
𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 ×𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑝𝑎𝑦− 𝑛𝑟𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 ×𝑛𝑟𝑝𝑎𝑦
𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 ×𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑝𝑎𝑦
.  
 
𝑖𝑎 is the incumbency advantage dummy variable which consists of three different values as 
described in the Data section. In addition, we also included a 𝑟𝑝𝑐𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜 variable that measures that 
proportion of political contributions to the Republican Party in the county.  
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The second hypothesis test for the transitive relationship between two findings: (1) natural 
resources wealth and management creates economic benefits to local communities and (2) 
economic conditions affect voting behavior towards incumbent candidate.  
ivratiocounty,election,year = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 ∙ ln(𝑜𝑖𝑙𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟) + 𝛽2 ∙ ln(𝑔𝑎𝑠𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟) + 𝛽3 ∙ 𝑖𝑎 + 𝛽4 ∙
𝑟𝑖𝑎 + 𝛽5 ∙
nremployment
𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡
+ 𝛽6 ∙
nrpay
𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑝𝑎𝑦
+ 𝛽7 ∙ ln(𝑜𝑖𝑙𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟) ∙ 𝑖𝑎 + 𝛽8 ∙
ln(𝑔𝑎𝑠𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟) ∙ 𝑖𝑎 + 𝛽9 ∙
nremployment
𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡
+ 𝛽10 ∙
nrpay
𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑝𝑎𝑦
+ 𝜖  
 
The regression model constructed is fairly similar to the first regression model. However, to test 
the effects of natural resources variable after holding the incumbency effects constant, the model 
included interaction terms which are the multiplication of the incumbency factors with the 
original variables. It is important to note that 𝑖𝑣 represents the incumbent party’s vote share and 
not the incumbent candidate vote share. Therefore, if the incumbent candidate is not running, the 
interaction terms will automatically be zero and the vote share will only depend on the remaining 
main effects.  
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CHAPTER III 
RESULTS 
 
By applying the fixed effect regression model described in the methodology section to the panel 
data, the results obtained are displayed in Table 1 below. In the table, the dependent variable is 
the Republican Party vote share.  
 
The table showed the importance of controlling for multiple fixed effects when running 
regressions. When the model controlled for the year, county and election type fixed effects, it is 
found that oil and gas production in the year prior to the election are statistically significant at 
the one percent level in predicting the vote share. However, oil and gas production in the current 
year are shown to be insignificant in the model. When the model only controlled for year fixed 
effects, the 𝑟𝑝𝑐𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜 and 𝑛𝑟𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 ratio are statistically significant variables in the model. 
However, the addition of county and election fixed effects immediately rendered the 
𝑛𝑟𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 to be insignificant. It can also be argued that political contribution is a response 
variable to the state of natural resources industry in a county and therefore, the variable may 
dilute the effects of the other variables. In model (7), the variable was removed and the 
𝑛𝑟𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 ratio was calculated to be weakly significant. In all the different variation of 
regression models, 𝑛𝑟𝑝𝑎𝑦 ratio is insignificant.  
 
The effects of oil and gas production on republican vote share is quite significant. On average, 
oil producing counties produces 1400,000 barrels of oil a year. The model showed that an 
average or above average oil producing county has republican votes of at least 2.4% more than a 
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non-oil producing state assuming all other things are equal. However, the variation in republican 
vote share between different producing states is extremely low. The coefficient showed that a 1% 
increase in oil production only contributes to a 0.0017 increase in the republican vote share. 
Similarly, a gas producing county extracts 6 billion cubic feet of gas annually on average. 
Compare to a non gas producing county, the county yields a 1.87% increase in republican vote 
share. This means that oil and gas production contributes an average of 4.2% towards the vote 
share. Incumbency advantage, on the other hand, contributes 7% towards the vote share. Another 
highlight from the model is the effect of the year variable on republican vote share. The year 
2006 and 2008 has 5% less republican votes than the other years studied.  
 
Table 2 below display the results of the 2nd fixed effect regression model described in the 
methodology section. The dependent variable is the incumbent party’s candidate’s vote share, 
𝑖𝑣𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜. The table showed that oil and gas production remains a huge predictor of incumbent 
party’s success. The plausible explanation is that a candidate, regardless of his party 
identification, will support the natural resources industry if his county is a producing region. This 
is further supported by the smaller party identified incumbency advantage in the model relative 
to that of  
One of the highlights in the table is the natural resources employment ratio. In the model, if the 
incumbent candidate is not running, the incumbent party losses 0.18% of vote share for every 
10% of oil and gas employment. However, the employment ratio contributes around 2.2% 
towards the vote share if the candidate is an incumbent. This represents a strong evidence that 
the transitive relations betfaween the aforementioned two findings hold.  
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Response: Incumbent Party 
Vote Share   
𝑂𝑖𝑙𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑣𝑖𝑜𝑢𝑠𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟  0.0055*** 
  (4.59) 
𝐺𝑎𝑠𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑣𝑖𝑜𝑢𝑠𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟  0.0026*** 
  (2.66) 
𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑦 𝐴𝑑𝑣𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑔𝑒  0.0230*** 
  (7.28) 
𝑁𝑎𝑡. 𝑅𝑒𝑠. 𝐸𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜  -0.0179 
  (-0.25) 
𝑁𝑎𝑡. 𝑅𝑒𝑠 𝑃𝑎𝑦 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜  -0.0587*** 
  (-9.90) 
Interaction Term with 
Incumbent  
𝑂𝑖𝑙𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑣𝑖𝑜𝑢𝑠𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟 ∙ 𝐼  0.0015** 
  (2.13) 
𝐺𝑎𝑠𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑣𝑖𝑜𝑢𝑠𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟 ∙ 𝐼  -0.0016*** 
  (-2.75) 
𝑁𝑎𝑡. 𝑅𝑒𝑠 𝐸𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜 ∙ 𝐼  0.2173*** 
  (3.76) 
𝑁𝑎𝑡. 𝑅𝑒𝑠 𝑃𝑎𝑦 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜 ∗ 𝐼  0.0721*** 
  (20.3) 
𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑡  0.5536*** 
Fixed Effect  
Year Yes 
County Yes 
Election Yes 
R-squared 0.1204 
N 20255 
Note: 
* Statistical significance at the ten percent level 
** Statistical significance at the five percent level 
*** Statistical significance at the one percent level  
Table 2 
 
 
 
 
16 
 
CHAPTER IV 
CONCLUSION 
 
Discussion 
Although the results found in the study verifies the hypotheses regarding the effects of natural 
resources on election outcomes, there are many other factors that should be studied and taken 
into consideration in future studies. A huge obstacle to this study is the lack of availability of 
data on the county-level. It may be advisable to construct the research on a state level to see if 
such micro analysis is needed.  
 
As mentioned in the introduction of the paper, government regulations and rent seeking behavior 
remain could be huge factors in enabling the industry to affect elections. The level of production 
taxes and land lease payments may influence the government’s decision in regulating drilling 
activities.  
 
Oil and gas prices are also important factors in deciding the level of production activities and its 
management in terms of pay ratio and employment ratio. To study the effects of oil and gas 
prices, future study could consider gas basis prices which prices are pertaining to specific 
regions. A highly flooded gas supply region may have high gas production despite its huge gas 
reserves.  
 
Many election related studies have also noted the importance of perception over reality. A 
county that has a strong economic outlook may not work in favor of the incumbent if the voters 
17 
 
perceive otherwise. In addition, it is also important to study the spillover effect of the natural 
resources industry to the rest of the economy. 
Conclusion  
The paper strongly showed that the Republican Party is benefiting from the natural resources 
industry in elections. Although it is not established if their actions warrant the support, it 
certainly tied voting behavior to the public perception that republican party is supportive of the 
industry. In regards to the effect of the industry to the incumbency effect, the study found 
evidence that the transitive relationship holds for oil production. This study is a preliminary 
approach to the examination of the political effects of the natural resources industry. It is worth 
considering whether the effect of the industry will disappear once the industry starts to plateau.  
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